The 9/11 Commission Report: Diplomacy

President Bill Clinton’s counterterrorism Presidential Decision Directives in 1995 (no.39) and May 1998 (no.62) reiterated that terrorism was a national security problem,not just a law enforcement issue.They reinforced the authority of the National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate domestic as well as foreign counterterrorism efforts, through Richard Clarke and his interagency Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG). Spotlighting new concerns about unconventional attacks, these directives assigned tasks to lead agencies but did not differentiate types of terrorist threats.

Thus,while Clarke might prod or push agencies to act,what actually happened was usually decided at the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA, or the Justice Department.The efforts of these agencies were sometimes energetic and sometimes effective.Terrorist plots were disrupted and individual terrorists were captured.But the United States did not, before 9/11, adopt as a clear strategic objective the elimination of al Qaeda.

The 9/11 Commission Report: Responses To Al Qaeda's Initial Assaults: Diplomacy